Jump to content
Black Chicken Studios Forums


  • Content Count

  • Joined

  • Last visited

Community Reputation

0 Neutral

About Urza3142

  • Rank
    Advanced Member

Profile Information

  • Gender
  • Location
    Livingston, New Jersey
  • Interests
    Military History, Literature, International Politics, Anime, Gaming, and anything WW2.
  1. tldr Where do Belles get their power from if not having their chosen captain is that big of an influence on their effectiveness? I want to echo this questioning as it was a source of confusion for me. I was under the impression previously that Belles gave their ships supernatural capabilities, which conveniently allows them to fight the Morgana on closer to equal terms. The statistics provided by the internal memo don't make sense within that context. "Where Navy ships carrying SAs without designated “Captains of the Fleet” seem to be 8 to 15% more effective against the unknown fleets than ships without SAs, the presence of a chosen captain can double or even triple performance according to the metrics proposed by [REDACTED]" This statement leads me to believe that either the memo writers are spit-balling a useless/incorrect statistic due to questionable data/questionable data analysis/intentional misrepresentation or that the nature of how a belle derives its supernatural powers was misunderstood by me. We know that both Morganas and Belles are "playing a whole other ball game" and are a step above normal ships. Mention of destroyer armor defeating BB shells has been in previous updates. If that is the case, how is a fleet with a "special advisor" but without a "captain of the fleet" only 8-15% more effective? What would data points in this range even look like in reality? A manifested belle that had her captain reassigned? Why would the absence of a captain lead to such a massive drop in capabilities? If what this memo writer writes is the case, it would suggest that far more of a belles capabilities come from her bond with her captain than I was led to believe. Which I would honestly find quite disappointing if that were the case. I'm generally not a fan of stories where we as a protagonist are elevated to such a ridiculous extent that it turns everyone else in said universe into observers rather than other actors.
  2. #3 please Let’s try to avoid unnecessary run ins with IRS. For the captain’s sake.
  3. Marc Lamont. I want to see something beautiful created from what will mostly likely be a horrific show.
  4. 1. Axum 2. Aoba 3. Fubuki 4. Nerpa 5. Algérie 6. Kitakami 7. Maillé Brézé 8. La Motte-Picquet 9. Takoa 10. D'Aosta Oh my. There's not a single capital ship on that list. I better get my hands on some Type 93s
  5. Option 3. If you can't have a clean game no one gets the pot.
  6. Nenohi and Nerpa... Because I want to see if it is possible to die from cuteness overload Alternatively Axum and Algerie for Tea vs Coffee
  7. https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/2b4e5021-2bf4-457b-b529-eeabb0abd3a6/A-Strategy-Has-to-Be-Able-to-Work-to-Be-Masterful-.aspx A great essay by Alan Zimm about the flaws within Genda's attack plan. To follow up on DrYuriMom, attacking the port facilities and oil fields isn't as clear cut as it seems. It takes an extraordinary amount of munitions to render a dockyard un-operational and this is often a task carried out by heavy bombers. The Japanese carriers simply couldn't carry enough munitions to render Pearl Harbor out of action for more than a trivial amount of time. As for oil tanks: "Alan Zimm has quite firmly debunked the myth that destroying the oil tank farms would have been easy. As oil silos would take hits, more flames and smoke would obscure the targets. There would be plenty of misses. They could not have been strafed. These were big oil silos with thick sides, floating tops (no oxygen inside the silos), fire suppression systems, berms to prevent leaking fuel from spreading to other silos, and good spacing between them. To overcome such defences, the Japanese would have needed to crack the tanks open with bombs to light them up. I'm not sure if the 60kg bombs that the A6M2s could carry would have done it (I highly doubt it), but in all likelihood they would have needed to use 250kg bombs carried by the D3A1s. Even if theoretically one could light fuel oil inside an oxygen free silo with a fire suppression system by strafing it, the Japanese aircraft capable of strafing which took part in the attack were armed with 7.7mm MGs (D3A1s with 2x7.7mm) and 20mm cannon (A6M2 Model 21s with 2x7.7mm and 2x20mm). The Japanese did not use AP or API ammunition like the Americans. They used AI and fuseless HE in their 7.7mm MGs and several different kinds of HE in their 20mm cannon. These shell types were great for destroying aircraft, but were useless for punching through the thick skin of oil silos. Overall, Alan Zimm's conclusion (accepted within the academic community) was that the Japanese could have done significant damage to the oil tank farms (though certainly not 100% destruction as people kind of just assume), but at the cost of a full wave of dive bombers. The results would have been the USN pulling tankers over to Pearl to act as temporary fuel storage while new oil silos were constructed (and the underground facilities then under construction would have no doubt been accelerated). Zimm gave a window for inconveniencing the Pacific Fleet of a few months. Nowhere near the apocalyptic appraisals of Kimmel, Nimitz and the older historiography. One can still debate whether or not the value of hitting the oil tank farms was better than, say, hitting various light fleet units in harbour. I don't really have a firm opinion myself, as the argument against bombing the oil tank farms isn't nearly as slam dunk as the silly "destroy the port facilities" nonsense. The Japanese ended up doing neither option anyway, and instead the majority of the second wave dive bombers blew their loads on Nevada (other BBs too IIRC). This is very recent scholarship, so it hasn't yet leaked into the popular conception of the battle. That process can take years, if not decades. The popular understanding of most of WWII is typically 30-50 years out of date compared to where the academic community currently is, simply because the vast majority of people don't have time (or the ability in the case of academic journals) to read the newest books and, more importantly, journal articles on any given subject." (Justin Pyke)
  8. D4 for the anniversary Tassafaronga. Not the most glamorous of battles, but an interesting example of the Japanese Long Lances paying off tactically if not strategically.
  9. Even in the event that the planned belles get beaten out of the vote, I would appreciate historical significance being honored over simply having a video interview put out as soon as its ready. I'm all for the delay.
  • Create New...