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I love finding articles and things to read up on such as official Naval Doctrine. If anyone has access to these types of things, post them here. They are often excellent primary sources for research, and fascinating reads. I'll start off with two items. One is an article on the US mark XIV torpedo and its failures. The second is an analysis of the surface warfare doctrines of the Americans and the Japanese over the pacific war.

 

http://www.historynet.com/us-torpedo-troubles-during-world-war-ii.htm

 

http://fireonthewaters.tripod.com/DOCTRINE%20ARTICLE.pdf

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While I appreciate the effort, shirogane, and that was a good read, I am actually looking for things more along the lines of actual primary source material. Those two links are wikipedia. It's a nice website that got me through high school, but it doesn't quite cut it for a scholar.

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Thanks for the two articles! Those were very interesting, especially the second one about surface combat doctrine.

 

You may or may not have seen this one already, considering its importance to the Pacific theater. Regardless, I think its interesting enough to warrant a post. This article covers the organization and logistical difficulties that plagued the Land and Naval branches of the Japanese Air Force.

 

http://www.historynet.com/japans-fatally-flawed-air-forces-in-world-war-ii-2.htm

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Much to my pleasure, I have found a comprehensive report on the battle of Leyte Gulf, compiled by the Australian Navy from After action reports from US navy ships and officers. It has finally solved two of my biggest questions about the battle, leaving me quite satisfied. It is quite the interesting read.

 

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Battle_Summary_No_40.pdf

 

Edit: I would also like to add the after action report from October 22-31, 1944 of a certain CV-6, USS Enterprise.

 

http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/action19441022-0056.htm

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There are some good articles on regiamarina.net, including some interviews.

 

This one has several good points, including the mention that one of the best Italian admirals of the war was an ardent womanizer, and it seems that one of his flames, in China in the 1920s, was none other than Wallis Simpson, the woman for which King Edward VIII abdicated the throne. It's notable the fact that he remarks that when he deviated, after a submarine attack, from his prescribed route, his convoy did not had any more attacks.

 

Another one is an interesting report from a junior British officer who spent four days onboard the Vittorio Veneto after the Italian surrender. There are many things of interest; but I find it funny that the author remarks that the Italian admiral was "untidy", then notes that soap was one of the goods that the Italians were scarce of... <_<

 

 

Much to my pleasure, I have found a comprehensive report on the battle of Leyte Gulf, compiled by the Australian Navy from After action reports from US navy ships and officers. It has finally solved two of my biggest questions about the battle, leaving me quite satisfied. It is quite the interesting read.

 

http://www.navy.gov.au/sites/default/files/documents/Battle_Summary_No_40.pdf

 

Edit: I would also like to add the after action report from October 22-31, 1944 of a certain CV-6, USS Enterprise.

 

http://www.cv6.org/ship/logs/action19441022-0056.htm

 

Can I ask which questions were those? I am interested in that battle.

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All will be revealed in time, but I will say it has to do with the force deployed to sink crippled ships in the northern force on 25th October, 1944.

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Here's a very interesting article for those interested in the German Navies. It explains the core reasons why German warships of the Imperial German Navy achieved such excellence, and why Kriegsmarine ships ranged from mediocre to disastrously bad. It was quite interesting for me at least, as I've been curious for quite some time as to why German ships in WW2 seemed so lackluster for a given displacement.

 

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-044.htm

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Seeing as Hood was the latest Belle, it seems fitting to post this. Came about from a discussion on Holland on Discord and I happened to find this, which is "a realistic look at Holland's decisions and tactics"

 

http://www.hmshood.com/history/denmarkstrait/holland.htm

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Here's an article by combined Fleet describing Japan's real chances of winning a war with America from an economic standpoint. It's a good read, and it gives a very sobering perspective as to why the IJN high command, especially Isoroku Yamamoto, was opposed to starting a war. I also recommend checking out more of Combined Fleet's articles, as they're all reasonably comprehensive and well-researched.

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

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Yes, I've read that report before.

 

What I really want to read, are the sequels to a speculative 'what-if?' novel that basically asked, how the war in the Pacific would have gone down if Yamamoto had chosen to launch a 3rd attack wave at Pearl to hit the fuel storage and drydocks.

 

The first book was the only one I read and it covered the attack itself, but I can't remember what the title was. (I borrowed it from the ship's 'library' on our deployment. Couldn't find the sequels there but that's not so surprising.)

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Yes, I've read that report before.

 

What I really want to read, are the sequels to a speculative 'what-if?' novel that basically asked, how the war in the Pacific would have gone down if Yamamoto had chosen to launch a 3rd attack wave at Pearl to hit the fuel storage and drydocks.

 

The first book was the only one I read and it covered the attack itself, but I can't remember what the title was. (I borrowed it from the ship's 'library' on our deployment. Couldn't find the sequels there but that's not so surprising.)

That sounds like Days of Infamy, by Harry Turtledove. See if that rings any bells.

 

If so, he wrote a second book: End of the Beginning.

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Most of the evidence given Japan's doctrine is that a 3rd wave wouldn't have targeted the drydocks and fuel depots anyway. Any more than the Japanese used I-boats to maraud commerce between the West Coast and Hawaii or between either and Australia. Japan didn't just make one single error related to the important stuff, they compounded it every month until it was too late.

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https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/2b4e5021-2bf4-457b-b529-eeabb0abd3a6/A-Strategy-Has-to-Be-Able-to-Work-to-Be-Masterful-.aspx

 

A great essay by Alan Zimm about the flaws within Genda's attack plan.

 

To follow up on DrYuriMom, attacking the port facilities and oil fields isn't as clear cut as it seems. It takes an extraordinary amount of munitions to render a dockyard un-operational and this is often a task carried out by heavy bombers. The Japanese carriers simply couldn't carry enough munitions to render Pearl Harbor out of action for more than a trivial amount of time.

 

As for oil tanks:

"Alan Zimm has quite firmly debunked the myth that destroying the oil tank farms would have been easy. As oil silos would take hits, more flames and smoke would obscure the targets. There would be plenty of misses. They could not have been strafed. These were big oil silos with thick sides, floating tops (no oxygen inside the silos), fire suppression systems, berms to prevent leaking fuel from spreading to other silos, and good spacing between them. To overcome such defences, the Japanese would have needed to crack the tanks open with bombs to light them up. I'm not sure if the 60kg bombs that the A6M2s could carry would have done it (I highly doubt it), but in all likelihood they would have needed to use 250kg bombs carried by the D3A1s. Even if theoretically one could light fuel oil inside an oxygen free silo with a fire suppression system by strafing it, the Japanese aircraft capable of strafing which took part in the attack were armed with 7.7mm MGs (D3A1s with 2x7.7mm) and 20mm cannon (A6M2 Model 21s with 2x7.7mm and 2x20mm). The Japanese did not use AP or API ammunition like the Americans. They used AI and fuseless HE in their 7.7mm MGs and several different kinds of HE in their 20mm cannon. These shell types were great for destroying aircraft, but were useless for punching through the thick skin of oil silos.

 

Overall, Alan Zimm's conclusion (accepted within the academic community) was that the Japanese could have done significant damage to the oil tank farms (though certainly not 100% destruction as people kind of just assume), but at the cost of a full wave of dive bombers. The results would have been the USN pulling tankers over to Pearl to act as temporary fuel storage while new oil silos were constructed (and the underground facilities then under construction would have no doubt been accelerated). Zimm gave a window for inconveniencing the Pacific Fleet of a few months. Nowhere near the apocalyptic appraisals of Kimmel, Nimitz and the older historiography.

 

One can still debate whether or not the value of hitting the oil tank farms was better than, say, hitting various light fleet units in harbour. I don't really have a firm opinion myself, as the argument against bombing the oil tank farms isn't nearly as slam dunk as the silly "destroy the port facilities" nonsense. The Japanese ended up doing neither option anyway, and instead the majority of the second wave dive bombers blew their loads on Nevada (other BBs too IIRC). This is very recent scholarship, so it hasn't yet leaked into the popular conception of the battle. That process can take years, if not decades. The popular understanding of most of WWII is typically 30-50 years out of date compared to where the academic community currently is, simply because the vast majority of people don't have time (or the ability in the case of academic journals) to read the newest books and, more importantly, journal articles on any given subject." (Justin Pyke)

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The above matches my understanding. We're learning so much now that we're paying attention to the material the Japanese have had all along...

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The Japanese mentality of attack, at the time, also focuses on hitting military units rather than war infrastructure. They wanted a quick decisive battle that would defeat the enemy in one go. Unfortunately for them, the US knew all they had to do was bleed them out since they couldn't make up loses in time.

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http://www.amw.gdynia.pl/library/File/ZeszytyNaukowe/2011/ZN_2_2011/Nawrot%20D.pdf

 

Polish Navy war after World War II in the concept of Admiral Jerzego Świrskeigo also known as Plan M and M + 3 - Return of the Polish ships to free Poland and build a strong fleet.

According to the concept of Plan M Polish Navy was composed in 1946 after returning to the country:

3 battleships

6 cruisers

6 aircraft carriers

36 destroyers

24 submarines

200 torpedo boats

12 frigates and corvettes

2 minelayer

36 minesweepers

An article in the Polish Language

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Huh. That certainly would have been interesting to see. Unlikely to ever be realized, but it's interesting to note that Poland could aspire to that kind of Naval development.

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Here's an article by combined Fleet describing Japan's real chances of winning a war with America from an economic standpoint. It's a good read, and it gives a very sobering perspective as to why the IJN high command, especially Isoroku Yamamoto, was opposed to starting a war. I also recommend checking out more of Combined Fleet's articles, as they're all reasonably comprehensive and well-researched.

 

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

 

Neat and quite enlightening. I knew some of that stuff before, but this article paints it out and really shows how big the difference was.

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Here's an article by combined Fleet describing Japan's real chances of winning a war with America from an economic standpoint. It's a good read, and it gives a very sobering perspective as to why the IJN high command, especially Isoroku Yamamoto, was opposed to starting a war. I also recommend checking out more of Combined Fleet's articles, as they're all reasonably comprehensive and well-researched.

 

http://www.combinedfleet.com/economic.htm

 

To be completely honest, while this article (which I did not read) may be valid, from my previous readings it is my opinion that, except for details about the Imperial Japanese Navy, the site is not that well-researched, especially in how it comes to conclusions, and how it has not been updated with more recent data.

I was especially puzzled by the comparison between the various battleships designs; I cannot recommend it as a worthwhile example of its kind.

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