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Dano
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The only diplomatic ties I'll be opening with Germany are the ones that lead to that goober with the stupid mustache being taken out.

 

How DARE you!

 

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The only diplomatic ties I'll be opening with Germany are the ones that lead to that goober with the stupid mustache being taken out.

 

Same here. Playing as Italy, I think that priority #1 should be to ally with Russia since they're relatively close and have vast resources. Italy had the least resources, and the least industry in WW2, so making ties with the US and Russia would be my primary goals. That's assuming they make Italy's pitiful supply situation an in game reality and that having rich friends is the way to fix it.

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The only diplomatic ties I'll be opening with Germany are the ones that lead to that goober with the stupid mustache being taken out.

 

I'll gladly hand him over to you. Just leave our people out of it.

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Welly's right, I'm gonna start CCCP, then gain diplo ties with the USA, then with Japan. Britain's most likely to be 4th on my list, but at that point it'll just be wherever progression of evens sends me. It's not that I dislike the Regia Marina or think their ships were particularly incompetent. Your arguments have actually done a good bit to swaying me from the notion that they were as useless as the rest of Italy in the war. However, If I ever do end up making diplo ties with Italy it will be late in the game and more of an afterthought than anything.

 

Hence, relatively poor relations.

 

Oh, I see.

Sorry if I misunderstood a bit, I had kinda forgotten the part about the diplomatic relations! :P

 

But it's alright; everyone should play how he likes, what he likes. So anybody around here is free to follow his own path.

 

Still, I would like to say that the efficiency and effectiveness of the other Italian armed forces (Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica) might deserve a second look, too. Without being revisionist, there are many works in these later years that point to the fact that they have been a bit bad-mouthed over the years, and they did just a bit better than it's commonly thought.

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Oh, I see.

Sorry if I misunderstood a bit, I had kinda forgotten the part about the diplomatic relations! :P

 

But it's alright; everyone should play how he likes, what he likes. So anybody around here is free to follow his own path.

 

Still, I would like to say that the efficiency and effectiveness of the other Italian armed forces (Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica) might deserve a second look, too. Without being revisionist, there are many works in these later years that point to the fact that they have been a bit bad-mouthed over the years, and they did just a bit better than it's commonly thought.

 

From the firsthand accounts I read, the Luftwaffe seemed to be universally under the impressions that having the Regia Aeronautica at your backs might as well be having no allies at all. That and I still love to reiterate where that Italian army of 570k men, nearly 500 planes, and 170 tanks lost to a Greek army of 200k men and 80 planes, and had to be helped by the Germans. In addition, the resources allocated therewith were drawn from the supply that was supposed to be used to assist with the invasion of Egypt to grant the Axis powers use of the Suez Canal, contributing to that defeat as well.

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From the firsthand accounts I read, the Luftwaffe seemed to be universally under the impressions that having the Regia Aeronautica at your backs might as well be having no allies at all. That and I still love to reiterate where that Italian army of 570k men, nearly 500 planes, and 170 tanks lost to a Greek army of 200k men and 80 planes, and had to be helped by the Germans. In addition, the resources allocated therewith were drawn from the supply that was supposed to be used to assist with the invasion of Egypt to grant the Axis powers use of the Suez Canal, contributing to that defeat as well.

 

Excuse me, but I believe that someone needs to hear everyone's side before making up his mind. The Luftwaffe had a low opinion of the Regia Aeronautica, true, but it also had the pleasant habit of trying to claim any success that Italian units may have had for his own; and for a while, many historians duly believed them.

 

I don't know where you took these figures, but they're wrong. The Italian invasion of Greece, while a by-the-book example of what not to do, was more so on a political level than a military one. The same Italian High Command (who nevertheless rolled up pretty easily, so they were far from blameless in this) said to Baldy that to invade it they needed twenty divisions, but when the war started only eight were present (for a total of around 85K fighting soldiers), and overall the Greeks outnumbered the Italians, not vice-versa; Baldy knew that, but ordered to go ahead nevertheless, trusting the field commander (that turned out to be incompetent). Afterwards, the situation changed, but FYI the Italians never attacked with 500K soldiers (that number includes all military personnel in Albania when the Germans attacked Greece, those ready to fight were more likely around 300K at most); plans for an offensive in March were shelved when the Jugoslavia matter came at the forefront.

Plane-wise, at the beginning the Regia Aeronautica had at the ready some 400 planes (counting however also recon and land seaplanes). Oh, and the Italian "tanks" were CV.33, so really tankettes; only after the campaign began arrived some M13/40 medium tanks (for all the good they could do, since the terrain was on the whole horrible for tanks).

Not to mention that the Italian units were generally weaker than the corresponding Greek ones (because they were binary divisions, i.e. divisions with two infantry regiments, and not three as everyone else's, and that went down to regiments, batallions, etc.), that the Regia Aeronautica was especially lacking in ground attack aircrafts (the ones you want to have in such a mountainous terrain to have an impact); that the terrain was difficult and the season was wrong; that the Greek soldiers had a psychological edge because they were defending their homeland against an invasion, while the Italian soldiers didn't know what the heck they were doing; that the logicistics infrastructure was inadequate to properly support all these men in Albania.

 

On a grand strategic level, it's not in discussion that the invasion of Greece was a mistake (although at the end, the occupation of some Greek mines allowed the Italian industry to receive some badly needed raw materials to build some modern artillery pieces and shells).

But if we talk mistakes, I think Italy didn't have the monopoly on them.

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Excuse me, but I believe that someone needs to hear everyone's side before making up his mind. The Luftwaffe had a low opinion of the Regia Aeronautica, true, but it also had the pleasant habit of trying to claim any success that Italian units may have had for his own; and for a while, many historians duly believed them.

 

I don't know where you took these figures, but they're wrong. The Italian invasion of Greece, while a by-the-book example of what not to do, was more so on a political level than a military one. The same Italian High Command (who nevertheless rolled up pretty easily, so they were far from blameless in this) said to Baldy that to invade it they needed twenty divisions, but when the war started only eight were present (for a total of around 85K fighting soldiers), and overall the Greeks outnumbered the Italians, not vice-versa; Baldy knew that, but ordered to go ahead nevertheless, trusting the field commander (that turned out to be incompetent). Afterwards, the situation changed, but FYI the Italians never attacked with 500K soldiers (that number includes all military personnel in Albania when the Germans attacked Greece, those ready to fight were more likely around 300K at most); plans for an offensive in March were shelved when the Jugoslavia matter came at the forefront.

Plane-wise, at the beginning the Regia Aeronautica had at the ready some 400 planes (counting however also recon and land seaplanes). Oh, and the Italian "tanks" were CV.33, so really tankettes; only after the campaign began arrived some M13/40 medium tanks (for all the good they could do, since the terrain was on the whole horrible for tanks).

Not to mention that the Italian units were generally weaker than the corresponding Greek ones (because they were binary divisions, i.e. divisions with two infantry regiments, and not three as everyone else's, and that went down to regiments, batallions, etc.), that the Regia Aeronautica was especially lacking in ground attack aircrafts (the ones you want to have in such a mountainous terrain to have an impact); that the terrain was difficult and the season was wrong; that the Greek soldiers had a psychological edge because they were defending their homeland against an invasion, while the Italian soldiers didn't know what the heck they were doing; that the logicistics infrastructure was inadequate to properly support all these men in Albania.

 

On a grand strategic level, it's not in discussion that the invasion of Greece was a mistake (although at the end, the occupation of some Greek mines allowed the Italian industry to receive some badly needed raw materials to build some modern artillery pieces and shells).

But if we talk mistakes, I think Italy didn't have the monopoly on them.

 

I believe I remember Rommel saying that the Italians were good soldiers with poor commanders when he fought alongside them in North Africa

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I believe I remember Rommel saying that the Italians were good soldiers with poor commanders when he fought alongside them in North Africa

 

He said that. But he was also prone to shift the blame for reverses on the Italian high command, rather than wondering if he had done everything right himself.

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Still, I would like to say that the efficiency and effectiveness of the other Italian armed forces (Regio Esercito and Regia Aeronautica) might deserve a second look, too. Without being revisionist, there are many works in these later years that point to the fact that they have been a bit bad-mouthed over the years, and they did just a bit better than it's commonly thought.

 

 

 

AFAIK, "bad as Italy army" was originated in 18xx(~Napoleonic wars) , widely mentioned in Interbellum(due to WW1 performance), and boosted up to 12 by GB after Operation Compass.

"Italian Navy" was partially joked after WW1, resurrected again by GB after Taranto raid

 

 

 

>But he was also prone to shift the blame for reverses on the Italian high command

Partially true : his logistic chain was partially handled by RM/RA

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Excuse me, but I believe that someone needs to hear everyone's side before making up his mind. The Luftwaffe had a low opinion of the Regia Aeronautica, true, but it also had the pleasant habit of trying to claim any success that Italian units may have had for his own; and for a while, many historians duly believed them.

 

I don't know where you took these figures, but they're wrong. The Italian invasion of Greece, while a by-the-book example of what not to do, was more so on a political level than a military one. The same Italian High Command (who nevertheless rolled up pretty easily, so they were far from blameless in this) said to Baldy that to invade it they needed twenty divisions, but when the war started only eight were present (for a total of around 85K fighting soldiers), and overall the Greeks outnumbered the Italians, not vice-versa; Baldy knew that, but ordered to go ahead nevertheless, trusting the field commander (that turned out to be incompetent). Afterwards, the situation changed, but FYI the Italians never attacked with 500K soldiers (that number includes all military personnel in Albania when the Germans attacked Greece, those ready to fight were more likely around 300K at most); plans for an offensive in March were shelved when the Jugoslavia matter came at the forefront.

Plane-wise, at the beginning the Regia Aeronautica had at the ready some 400 planes (counting however also recon and land seaplanes). Oh, and the Italian "tanks" were CV.33, so really tankettes; only after the campaign began arrived some M13/40 medium tanks (for all the good they could do, since the terrain was on the whole horrible for tanks).

Not to mention that the Italian units were generally weaker than the corresponding Greek ones (because they were binary divisions, i.e. divisions with two infantry regiments, and not three as everyone else's, and that went down to regiments, batallions, etc.), that the Regia Aeronautica was especially lacking in ground attack aircrafts (the ones you want to have in such a mountainous terrain to have an impact); that the terrain was difficult and the season was wrong; that the Greek soldiers had a psychological edge because they were defending their homeland against an invasion, while the Italian soldiers didn't know what the heck they were doing; that the logicistics infrastructure was inadequate to properly support all these men in Albania.

 

On a grand strategic level, it's not in discussion that the invasion of Greece was a mistake (although at the end, the occupation of some Greek mines allowed the Italian industry to receive some badly needed raw materials to build some modern artillery pieces and shells).

But if we talk mistakes, I think Italy didn't have the monopoly on them.

 

 

maxresdefault.jpg

 

 

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AFAIK, "bad as Italy army" was originated in 18xx(~Napoleonic wars) , widely mentioned in Interbellum(due to WW1 performance), and boosted up to 12 by GB after Operation Compass.

"Italian Navy" was partially joked after WW1, resurrected again by GB after Taranto raid

 

 

 

>But he was also prone to shift the blame for reverses on the Italian high command

Partially true : his logistic chain was partially handled by RM/RA

 

Italy's role in the Napoleonic Wars was nothing to sneeze at, even if it wasn't unified yet. The Italians under Napoleon generally fought well.

 

I disagree on the "post WWI" remark, since I believe that to some degree the fact that Italy survived Caporetto to make a comeback and deal a knockout blow at Vittorio Veneto has to get some respect.

I'd point out to the way more mixed record of the wars of the Risorgimento, especially the 1848 and the 1866 ones (with the exception of Giuseppe Garibaldi), and the battle of Adwa in 1896 (the worst defeat of a colonial empire, but it's just our luck that we ran into one of the strongest African states left!).

 

As for logistics (which were toitally handled by the Italians, for better or for worse), Rommel kept believing that Italian traitors were responsible for the British successes against the sea lanes, while now we know that it was mostly because the Enigma machine was cracked by ULTRA. But the idea that a German source could be blamed never touched his mind.

And, beside that, he was repeatedly warned in 1942 that if he invaded Egypt he couldn't be resupplied as much as he would have needed. He didn't listen, but when the situation got bad he forgot that.

 

 

 

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6hxHb4Q.png

 

 

:D

 

Look guys, you don't have to take me at face value. In fact, I encourage you to go and find sources and books on your own to make your own opinion.

I'm sharing what I know, but I'm the first to acknowledge that I may not be the most objective person when we talk about these things. So, feel free to look around and learn about it, and if you whip up something that proves I may have been wrong here and there, I'll stand corrected.

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As for logistics (which were toitally handled by the Italians, for better or for worse), Rommel kept believing that Italian traitors were responsible for the British successes against the sea lanes, while now we know that it was mostly because the Enigma machine was cracked by ULTRA. But the idea that a German source could be blamed never touched his mind.

And, beside that, he was repeatedly warned in 1942 that if he invaded Egypt he couldn't be resupplied as much as he would have needed. He didn't listen, but when the situation got bad he forgot that.

 

 

 

Signals intelligence was of great importance in the Mediterranean theater. When

Italy entered the war on June 10, 1940, the Allies could read many of the Italian

codes and ciphers. In addition, some ciphers were captured from Italian submarines

forced to surface. But the Italians soon changed many of their systems, and decryption

fell off sharply as a result. Then, in February 1941, Bletchley Park cracked the

German air force cipher Light Blue and the Italian version of the Enigma known

as Alfa, used for radio communication between Rome and the Dodecanese Islands.

These successes had important consequences, most notably in defeating the Italian

navy at the Battle of Cape Matapan in March 1941.

In May 1941, decryption of the German signals provided excellent intelligence

concerning German plans to invade Crete, but the British defense of the island

failed because the German air force controlled the skies and because the intercepts

included misleading information about a German seaborne invasion. As it transpired,

this was not a significant German effort, but it led the British to shift defensive

assets to the north, away from the airfields, where the main German assault

occurred. The Battle of Crete revealed both the advantages and disadvantages of

signals intelligence regarding enemy intentions.

From June 1941, Bletchley Park’s decryption of the Italian Hagelin naval cipher

machine C-38m used in communications between Supermarina in Rome and

Tripoli had important consequences for Axis resupply of Axis forces in the western

desert. Axis shipping losses increased dramatically in the second half of 1941 and

1942, when it became possible to vector Allied submarines and surface warship

strike groups from Malta to intercept Italian convoys between Sicily and the Tunisian

coast and Tripoli. The British always tried first to send reconnaissance aircraft

to report the target, so the signals they sent prevented the Italians from recognizing

the true source of the information.

Decrypted signals had to be used judiciously. Thus Afrika Korps commander

General Erwin Rommel exaggerated the evils of his supply situation to gain additional

support, causing British prime minister Winston L. S. Churchill twice to

order his commanders in the field to begin offensives that then failed in Rommel’s

counterattacks. Rommel also learned much about British force strengths in Egypt,

because the U.S. military attaché in Cairo used a code broken by the Italians for

his reports.

Allied commanders also made different use of SIGINT results in operations extending

from El Alamein to Tunisia and during the landing operations at Sicily,

Salerno, and Anzio. Revelations of the ULTRA secret in 1975 did force a reconsideration

of the military reputations of several Allied commanders, including Field

Marshal Bernard Montgomery.

 

© Rohwer

 

>Look guys, you don't have to take me at face value.

My fault, forgot to tag it <offtopic>

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